PushCoin v3 – the next major release scheduled for 2026/27 – will enforce two rules in the chart of accounts: Why this matters Example account tree A product, such as Hot Meal, can be assigned to revenue account 4120 Lunch (leaf), but not to 4100 Food service revenue because the latter account (code 4100) has […]
All posts by Slawomir Lisznianski
Hotmail (Outlook/Live) isn’t delivering our emails: what you can do
Many customers who use Hotmail.com addresses (Outlook, Live) aren’t receiving PushCoin emails (receipts, password resets, support replies). The messages are being filtered on Microsoft’s side and often never reach the Inbox or Junk folder. We can’t override Hotmail.com’s filters, but a few steps sometimes help. What’s happening Microsoft’s Outlook.com uses aggressive filtering and reputation systems. […]
Why your payment may take a few days to appear
We know it can be frustrating when you make a payment and don’t see it immediately reflected in your school account. With recent increases in fraudulent transactions, our system waits until funds fully clear the banking system before they can be used to transfer to another student account or pay school fees. Card vs eCheck […]
Navigating meal applications with Medicaid numbers: a brief guide for school business officials
With the increasing use of direct certification and families submitting applications containing both income data and a Medicaid number (or SNAP/TANF), school business officials must navigate these applications carefully to stay compliant with USDA regulations and state privacy laws. This guide outlines the correct procedure for evaluating such applications under the National School Lunch Program […]
Reframing the Registration Fee: A sustainable policy to reduce refund burden on schools
Each year, school districts invest significant time and resources processing student registrations—verifying documents, assigning placements, planning class sizes, ordering materials, provisioning technology, and more. Yet, an increasing number of families enroll in multiple districts simultaneously, ultimately choosing one and requesting refunds from the rest. This practice, while understandable from a family’s perspective, leaves districts facing […]
Must Illinois public schools serve meals to students without money—even not on NSLP?
School business officials across Illinois have long understood the requirements of the National School Lunch Program (NSLP): schools that participate must provide a meal to any student who requests one, regardless of their ability to pay. But what happens when a school building—often a high school in a unit district—does not participate in NSLP? Can […]
Student Wallets Reinvented: A Look into PushCoin V2
In the next major release of PushCoin, the Student Wallet feature has been significantly redesigned. PushCoin V1 (Current Version) In the current production version (V1), the Student Wallet functions as an account that can accept both charges—typically from cafeteria point-of-sale (POS) systems—and deposits from parents. Charges for meals deduct the Wallet balance, while other charges, […]
Identified Inconsistencies in USDA Income Eligibility Guidelines Based on Income Frequency Reporting
Policy Memorandum Subject: Identified Inconsistencies in USDA Income Eligibility Guidelines Based on Income Frequency Reporting Reported to USDA, ISBE: October 25, 2019Most recent update: June 6, 2025 Author: Slawomir Lisznianski, PushCoin Overview Analysis of the USDA Income Eligibility Guidelines for Free and Reduced-Price Meals (130% and 185% of the Federal Poverty Level) for the 48 […]
New feature: controlling access to student accounts
Your district can request that anyone wishing to link to a student must enter a valid registration code. Currently, if sufficient student personal information is entered, a parent can look up their child without knowing the registration code. The personal information required to find a student without the registration code includes all of: date of […]
New type of attacks targeting email accounts
We have received a report of a fairly sophisticated attack on a parent email account at AT&T (serviced by Yahoo). The attack works as follows: a parent’s email account is compromised. The original emails are deleted and substituted with look-alike emails with injected content by the attackers. The injected content can include links to websites […]